Lee Jae-myung said that he was the mastermind behind the project, while Yoo Dong-gyu was merely a working-level official. @Photo = Channel A screen capture
(Seoul = FreedomChosun)
In South Korea, the prosecution service is experiencing a significant internal conflict centred around a decision by the Supreme Prosecutors' Office of the Republic of Korea (SPO) and its acting head, Noh Man‑seok (acting Prosecutor General). The central issue is the decision to withdraw an appeal in a major corruption case, and the resulting protests and resignations among prosecutors.
The case in question involves the Daejang‑dong development project in Gyeonggi Province. On 7 November 2025 the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office (SCDPO) decided not to appeal a verdict in which several defendants, including private developer Kim Man‑bae, had been convicted.
This decision came despite the investigation and trial teams recommending that an appeal should be filed. Prosecutors say they were instructed late - just hours before the deadline - to abandon the appeal without being given a clear legal reason.
Acting Prosecutor General Noh Man-seok publicly defended the decision, stating that it was made 'after careful consideration and consultation with the head of the SCDPO' and that the Ministry of Justice’s opinion was referred to.
However, the head of the SCDPO, Chung Jin‑woo, shortly thereafter submitted his resignation, saying that he and his office had advised to appeal to the end, but the decision was made by the SPO and so he accepted responsibility.
Many frontline prosecutors are now protesting: they argue the chain of command and legal rationale were opaque, that they were denied the opportunity to file the appeal even after following internal procedures, and that the decision appears to favour politically-connected parties. One prosecutor wrote internally:
“We gathered opinions to file an appeal … but were told by the fourth deputy chief prosecutor of SCDPO that both the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and the chief prosecutor did not permit it, so there was no other choice.”
Underlying this specific case is a broader context: the new administration of Lee Jae‑myung is pushing major reforms of the prosecution service, including reduction of its investigatory autonomy, separation of investigation and indictment functions, and leadership overhauls.
Many prosecutors see this as threatening their institutional independence, while the government argues reform is needed to restore impartiality. The SCDPO’s frustration arises partly because they believe legal criteria for the appeal exist but were overridden by higher authorities or influenced by political factors.
In short, the confrontation can be described as follows:
Investigative prosecutors, convinced that an appeal was justified on legal grounds, felt overruled without explanation.
The SPO and its acting head claim responsibility for strategic decision-making, citing deliberation and consultation.
The head of the SCDPO resigned to clarify institutional disagreement and assume accountability.
Prosecutors, concerned about independence and transparency, are protesting what they view as undue interference.
The government’s reform agenda serves as the backdrop, intensifying these tensions.
The significance of this conflict is high: it touches on the rule of law, institutional autonomy, prosecutorial discretion, and political influence in legal processes. If prosecutorial leadership decisions are perceived as politically tainted, public trust may erode; if prosecutors feel unable to carry out legally justified actions, the effectiveness of prosecutions may decline.
In conclusion, the protest and resignations within South Korea’s prosecution service reflect a deeper struggle over who holds decision-making power in major cases, how legal judgments are made or abandoned, and what role the political context plays in these processes. The appeal withdrawal in the Daejang-dong case has become a flashpoint revealing these broader institutional tensions.